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automotive industry after the 2008  
financial crisis
Abstract: Apart from being one of the hardest hit sectors during the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, the auto sector is also a prominent sector where emerging auto markets 
such as China have fared relatively well compared to their competitors in North 
America and Europe. This paper examines various ways that nations have shifted 
their policy gears to revive and restructure the automotive industry by using the 
case studies of the USA, France, and China. New sets of policy initiatives are con-
tingent on particular industrial and institutional contexts, but both developed 
and developing countries have employed wide range of “murky” protectionist 
measures. This makes it unlikely for the WTO member countries to take a naming 
and shaming approach and file a case at the WTO level, which poses challenges 
to the WTO rules and trade liberalization.
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1  Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis greatly impacted the major automotive manu-
facturing countries with an unprecedented scale of market crash, rendering the 
automotive sector the hardest hit along with the banking sector. With the need 
to maintain employment and build industrial capacity, major automotive manu-
facturing countries intervened in the market through bailouts and subsidies for 
both producers and consumers at an unprecedented scale; this was politically 
unthinkable just a few years ago, especially in Europe and North America. The 
mercantilist sentiment of “exporting as good and importing as bad” arose, and 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies of discriminating against foreign imports and 
demanding repatriation of manufacturing base in exchange for state aid were 
widely adopted and justified as a way to fix market failures.
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Such a simple equation, however, rests on the illusion that the automotive 
market crash is a temporary problem that can be rescued through bailing out 
domestic companies and blocking foreign brands. Instead, the crisis of the past 
decade has unearthed several long-term and deeply rooted structural problems 
of the automotive industry, especially those in developed economies. From the 
supply side, automotive manufacturers have suffered from excess production 
capacity since the early 2000s, followed by declining relative productivity and 
diminishing returns from innovation. From the demand side, the falling sales 
reflect structural market situations such as a high level of car ownership and 
demography in developed economies compared to that in the emerging econo-
mies. The 2008 credit crunch brought these problems to the surface by breaking 
the model of pumping up sales through easy consumer credit with zero-down 
payments and zero-interest financing.
This explains why the automotive industry is one prominent sector where 
emerging automotive markets such as China and Brazil have fared particularly 
well relative to their competitors. Their sales reflect new purchases rather than 
replacement, because their demographic structure and projections for income 
growth makes the crisis less of a structural problem and more of a temporary 
sales slump. Such a stark contrast between the economic woes of the liberal 
market economies and the relatively thriving economies in state-centric countries 
sparked a significant debate over newly strengthened industrial policies, while 
providing political justifications for mercantilist policies.
Domestic debates on the use of industrial policy involves whether govern-
ment intervention is beneficial for the long-term competitiveness of the sector. 
Governments often lack omniscience on choosing winners and devising discerna-
ble exit strategies, and state intervention in a particular sector surrenders private 
business interest under political logic.1 What significantly concerns the propo-
nents of trade liberalization is potential discrimination against foreign imports 
and even transplant companies within the same national boundary. Since gov-
ernments are increasingly sensitive to populist calls to keep the manufactur-
ing jobs at home, then it is worth having the debate whether foreign brands in 
America that hire American workers and source local parts should be viewed as 
domestic industries.
The employment of numerous forms of state intervention and outright 
domestic industry protections also raises important questions for the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). What implications will be faced by the WTO due to some of 
its “murky” protectionist measures that include bailouts, public procurement, 
1 Barfield (2009); Brunel and Hufbauer (2009).
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and quantitative restrictions of import?2 Besides the nature of such measures, 
how are the WTO’s trade prospects affected by its frequent use of discriminatory 
measures as its foremost method of surviving the financial crisis? Even if these 
measures are unwinding, would the WTO remain unscathed despite its former 
use of industrial policies?
This article examines the cumulative impact of diverse national policy meas-
ures to revive and restructure the automotive industry in response to the 2008 
global financial crisis. In doing so, I first argue that the impact of state interven-
tion varies depending on the compatibility between the condition of state aid 
and the source of the structural problems. The US government expedited neces-
sary restructuring of the industry by tying state aid to job cuts and reductions in 
benefits, while the French government attempted to tackle massive overcapac-
ity through freezes on factory closures and repatriation of some factories from 
other European countries. The French government has seemingly followed the 
costly precedent set by the British auto industry in the 1970s, where state inter-
vention was utilized to keep domestic ownership, which postponed necessary 
restructuring and had a detrimental impact on saving jobs in the long-term. The 
development of a global production network also complicates the political payoff 
of protectionist and in-ward looking national strategies because of diverging 
interests between those who focus on volume maximizing (i.e., Fiat and Peugeot) 
mostly in regional market, and those who emphasize margins and aggressive 
expansion to emerging economies (i.e., Volkswagen). In Europe especially, the 
crisis has further divided the two and has certainly hurt the former.
Second, while trade restrictions have thus far played a small role relative to 
subsidizing domestic industry, national strategies in the form of taxing or restrict-
ing market access to foreign industries are more disputed at the WTO because 
of its clear negative cross-border spillovers, compared to the murky strategies of 
subsidizing domestic industries. The bailouts of domestic automakers against 
transplants are discriminatory; however, whether it is consistent with WTO rules 
depends on an impact that is not immediately measurable. In addition, the wide 
use of state intervention makes the mercantilist practice a new equilibrium and 
aggravates the collective action problem.
Third, three cases brought to the WTO in the automotive industry since 2005 
suggest that the trade disputes often spiral into high-stake game of tit-for-tat and 
that the final ruling does not serve as a deterrent. Member states can still find a 
2 Baldwin and Evenett define murky protectionism as “abuses of legitimate discretion which are 
used to discriminate against foreign goods, companies, workers, and investors” (Baldwin and 
Evenett 2009: p. 4).
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way to uphold its industry through various measures or spill over the tensions into 
different issue areas. Also, emerging economies, such as China, liberally imple-
ment industrial policies in order to achieve economic development goals and 
remove them only after coming into dispute at the WTO. Given the low prospect of 
the WTO in proceeding with trade liberalization, bilateral negotiations over free 
trade agreements have been gained currency. Most policymakers in developed 
countries have learned their lesson from the haunting memory of the 1930s when 
tariff protectionism prolonged and deepened the Great Depression. However, FTA 
negotiations are also hampered by narrowly defined sectoral emphasis and the 
mercantilist belief that imports are the problems of economic crisis.
This article begins by providing a broad overview of the global automotive 
industry and examples of key countries that exemplify the types of state inter-
vention in the automotive sector in response to the financial crisis. The US case 
demonstrates how government intervention in the automotive sector effectively 
functioned as an emergency remedy in expediting the restructuring process. 
French governmental intervention in the sector is a classic example of how pro-
tectionism interferes with the national automaker’s long-term competitiveness at 
the domestic and global level. Chinese policies serve as a representative case of 
the auto sector in emerging economies where the financial crisis is more of a sales 
slump problem rather than a structural issue. The final section discusses three 
WTO trade disputes in the automotive sector and evaluates the prospects of the 
WTO in forging trade liberalization in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.
2  Overview of the global automotive industry
During the 2008 financial crisis, nearly all sectors experienced decreasing sales 
as well as firms teetering on the edge of or falling into bankruptcy. Yet, in major 
car producing countries, the automotive sector was among one of the hardest hit 
by the crisis, accentuating the problem of excess production capacity from the 
pre-crisis era. It was also a prominent sector where emerging markets fared par-
ticularly well relative to their competitors. Within a span of 1 year, from late 2008 
through 2009, global vehicle production dropped more than 10 million units in 
2009, from the 72 million units that were built in 2007 (Figure 1). North America 
and Western Europe suffered a sharp drop in vehicle production and growth, 
making the annual growth rate of production from 2007 to 2008 decline by 17.5% 
for the US, 20.5% for Canada, and 28.7% for France (Table 1). On the other hand, 
emerging economies like Brazil and China reported positive growth, with Brazil 
increasing by 8.5%, and China rising by 5%.
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3 Compiled from OICA, International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers.
4 Compiled from OICA, International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers.
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Figure 1 Global auto production.3
Table 1 Passenger vehicle production levels and growth (2002–2008)4 [unit: thousands].
 
 
Annual growth 
 
Annual growth
2002  2007  2002–2007 (%) 2008  2007–2008 (%)
North America
 US   12,280  10,611  –2.88  8746  –17.58
 Canada   2629  2602  –0.21  2068  –20.52
 Mexico   1805  2254  4.54  2154  –4.44
Western Europe
 France   3292  3010  –1.78  2145  –28.74
 Germany   5145  6200  3.80  5500  –11.29
 Italy   1427  1284  –2.09  1085  –15.47
 UK   1821  1770  –0.57  1450  –18.08
Northeast Asia
 Japan   10,258  11,596  2.48  11,564  –0.28
 South Korea  3148  4085  5.35  3830  –6.24
Emerging economies
 Brazil   1793  2960  10.55  3210  8.45
 Russia   1220  1654  6.28  1776  7.40
 China   3251  8890  22.29  9.340  5.06
 India   892  2046  18.06  2022  –1.20
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The blatant contrast between the economic woes in America and Europe 
and the relatively thriving performance in emerging economies reflect two major 
trends in the automotive sector that have developed over the past decade. Firstly, 
the past decade witnessed a rapid growth in terms of the global supply chain and 
overall outsourcing of manufacturing industries.5 Developing countries’ shares in 
world-manufactured exports rose from 20% in 1992 to 29% in 2000, and reached 
39% in 2009.6 In 2010, non-OECD countries generated half of the world GDP 
measured in purchasing power parity,7 and for the first time, developing econo-
mies absorbed close to half of foreign direct investment inflows.8 Very few sectors 
besides the auto sector reflect such a shift of the center of gravity in demand and 
supply from developed to developing countries, especially to Asia and Eastern 
Europe. In terms of supply, market saturation in developed countries, high ship-
ping costs, and trade barriers to access emerging markets prompted automak-
ers from North America and Europe to increasingly relocate their production to 
emerging markets since 2000, as well as adopt “make-your-car-where-you-sell” 
strategies. Modular production and development of technology further acceler-
ated the globalization of the auto production process. The center of demand has 
shifted as well. The automobile world market grew steadily by 3.5% from 2000 to 
2007 (Table 1); however, the share held by the US and Japan in global production 
fell from 40% to 30%, while the share of non-OECD areas increased from produc-
ing one car in ten to one car in five.9 The economic crisis further reinforced and 
accelerated this trend as car sales and demands were maintained in emerging 
economies.
Secondly, selling autos through easy consumer credit has become a widely 
used business strategy for the past decade. By nature, auto sales are extremely 
responsive to economic cycles of boom and bust since purchasing a vehicle 
reflects discretionary spending. From the early 2000s, auto markets in North 
America and Europe have slowed down due to excess production capacity.10 Easy 
consumer credit with zero-down payments and zero-interest financing enabled 
automakers to pump up sales with large rebates. However, the 2008 credit crunch 
broke that model by decreasing access to affordable credit, therefore making 
many households postpone their car purchases. A sharp reduction in domestic 
vehicle sales along with a crash in key automotive export markets left every single 
5 Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005); Pilat, Cimper, and Webb (2008).
6 UNIDO (2011).
7 OECD (2013).
8 UNCTAD (2012).
9 OECD (2010).
10 Time, 30 July 2012.
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manufacturer suffering from significant cash burn. On the other hand, the emerg-
ing economies who were less integrated into the global financial system were 
partly unscathed by the credit crunch. They did not significantly participate in 
advanced financial services transactions such as subprime loans in the US.11 For 
example, 80% of vehicle purchases are credit-based in the US and the UK, and 
75% in India. However, the opposite is true in China, where 80% of car purchases 
are made in cash.12 Undoubtedly, no auto market was immune to the impact of the 
financial crisis, but these two trends partly explain the varying impact of the crisis 
in different parts of the world: for saturated market in developed economies, the 
crisis unearthed existing structural problems of overcapacity and market satura-
tion, while in emerging economies, it meant a temporary sales slump.
3  National responses and governmental measures
Given the grave impact of the automotive industry on job maintenance and overall 
manufacturing performance, both developed and developing countries have 
taken a variety of supporting measures to revamp their automotive sectors. Only 
in the banking sector did the government intervene on a larger scale than it did 
in the automotive industry. A range of factors motivated and justified governmen-
tal intervention in the automotive industry in the wake of the crisis. Firstly, geo-
graphically concentrated employment and strong labor unions make the industry 
politically sensitive, prompting governments to respond with various policies to 
boost car sales and directly support the industry. Secondly, the automotive indus-
try’s long supply chain with upstream and downstream industries has a signifi-
cant multiplier effect on broader economic performance. Thirdly, because the 
automotive industry is extremely concentrated at the top, with a few large leading 
firms and hierarchical supply chains, political intervention seems to be feasible 
and manageable by propping up leading firms. Fourthly, bailing out automakers 
can help solve credit problems in cases where automakers have financing com-
panies. Lastly, stimulating automotive demand is regarded as an effective way 
to strengthen aggregate demand by moving purchases forward.13 Thus, govern-
ments in major automotive producing countries have adopted measures ranging 
from tax relief or subsidies to direct involvement in industry restructuring plans. 
Although these measures have been criticized as not only impeding structural 
11 James (2008).
12 IMVP (2009: p. 4); PWC (2009).
13 In most countries, the bulk of vehicle sales are financed (90% in the US).
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changes that the industry needs to take in the coming years, but also functioning 
as potential protectionist measures against foreign commercial interest,14 pundits 
and experts agree on their necessary role in keeping the industry afloat.
 – Credit warranties: This is the least controversial form of intervention and is 
typically not limited to the automotive industry. Most countries have initiated 
schemes to guarantee or extend credit. The most commonly used approaches 
to support the automotive industry are earmarking loans for research and 
development, developing environmentally friendly vehicles, or securing 
loans with company lands or buildings.
 – Subsidized credit facilities: The slowdown of automotive markets in North 
America and in Western Europe was closely tied to the drying up of cheap 
consumer credit. For example, the total amount of cars being sold in the US 
market was significantly tied up with the credit of home equity lines, with 
24% of total sales in 2006 being financed this way. When the availability 
of these loans dried up due to the 2008 mortgage crisis, sales of vehicles 
declined drastically: they dropped from over fifteen million in 2006 to just 
above ten million in 2009.15 Thus, various governments decided to provide 
subsidies to credit units of automakers.
 – Purchase subsidies for consumers (Scrapping schemes): Besides producer 
subsidies, consumer incentives were also introduced to artificially uphold 
consumer demand. Governments subsidized the purchase of new vehicles to 
replace old energy-inefficient vehicles through the so-called “cash-for-clun-
kers” schemes. The main objective was to shift household expenditures from 
the future to the present and to introduce energy-efficient vehicles to yield 
environmental benefits. The conditionality of the program varied widely 
across countries. For example, the value of vouchers was $1300 (€1000) in 
France and $3300 (€2500) in Germany, creating a risk of distorted competi-
tion. As a result of these temporary measures that were set to expire by the 
end of 2009 in most countries, there was a boost in sales. In the US, the first 
half of 2009 observed a surge in sales, yet sales dropped back to their pre-
incentive level with the end of incentive. Likewise, in Europe, new car regis-
trations rose sharply since the beginning of 2009, with substantial increases 
in Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and the UK. On the 
other hand, the French government did not consider the program to be suc-
cessful since people swapped their old cars for cheap new cars manufactured 
outside Europe, rather than purchasing domestic brands. The nature of the 
program also varied from protectionist to non-discriminatory. Notably, the 
14 OECD (2010).
15 Bai (2012: p. 16).
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German program was designed to avoid discrimination against foreign firms 
by bringing positive spillover effects to other countries that exported small 
and inexpensive cars to Germany, including the Slovak Republic, France 
and Italy. Germany’s program also boosted car and parts manufacturing in 
Poland, which itself did not introduce any scrapping program. On the other 
hand, China’s scrapping program was discriminatory and protectionist 
because it was used to encourage the purchase of local Chinese brands such 
as Geely and BYD.
 – Direct governmental loans, loan guarantees or subsidies: Support has 
also taken the form of direct governmental loans and subsidies for firms 
facing difficulties. The direct insertion of working capital to specific compa-
nies is unlikely to come without policymakers gaining some level of influ-
ence over decision-making. This can be seen through the involvement of 
the US (and Canadian) governments in the quick bankruptcy procedures of 
General Motors and Chrysler that were characterized by exchanging large 
equity stakes for debtor-in-possession financing. Government intervention 
in strategic decision-making became more explicit by beginning to include 
conditions such as appointing new top management, demanding larger wage 
cuts, restructuring product portfolios, and insisting on additional plant clo-
sures. Several countries utilize this scheme as a stay-home bonus to maintain 
employment and domestic manufacturing.16
According to the Global Trade Alert database, a total of 57 state measures have 
been recorded in the automotive sector from July 2009 to February 2014; 42 meas-
ures have been implemented, and the rest have been announced and are pending 
implementation. Of the implemented measures, about 45% (19 measures) are 
marked red, indicating a certain level of discrimination against foreign commer-
cial interests. The most representative types in this category are state aids, bail-
outs and other forms of financial assistance to companies; every single country 
in the database has employed this measure (Figure 2). A total of 11 measures 
are flagged amber to denote potential discrimination against foreign commer-
cial interests including import bans and local content requirements. Brazil has 
employed the most number of measures (16 measures) with seven green and five 
red measures, whereas all three of China’s measures are flagged red with clear 
discrimination against foreign commercial interest.
Notably, most auto producing countries adopted bailouts, but there was 
no direct case that was brought to the WTO. The most distinct case was China’s 
imposition of anti-subsidy tariffs on American-imported vehicles from GM and 
16 The Telegraph, 24 October 2012. 
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Chrysler, arguing that the US government bailout had the effect of providing 
subsidies for these manufacturers’ exports. However, given the wide use of sec-
toral intervention, there barely is a legitimate reason for member states to chal-
lenge other nations’ subsidy programs by bringing a case to the WTO and take 
a naming and shaming approach. For example, France’s then president, Nicho-
las Sarkozy, stated “the situation in Europe means that you cannot accuse any 
country of being protectionist when the Americans put up $30 billion to support 
their automotive industry.”18 This surely aggravates the collective action problem 
where each WTO member country is increasingly tempted to shirk their commit-
ments and take opportunistic behaviors, thereby undermining the WTO norms 
and rules.19
3.1  North America and the United States
Although the automotive crisis was a global phenomenon, American manufac-
turers were relatively more affected than any of the other foreign manufactur-
ers, driving the Big Three – GM, Ford, and Chrysler – to the verge of bankruptcy 
in 2008 and jeopardizing overall national economic performance. The Big Three 
suffered from the unprecedented speed and severity of the collapse of sales: GM 
suffered from a 45% drop in sales, Ford experienced a 42% decline, and Chrysler 
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17 Compiled from Global Trade Alert.
18 Baldwin and Evenett (2009: p. 5).
19 Olson (1965).
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underwent a 46% decrease in the first four months of 2009 compared with the 
same period in 2008. The factors responsible for the severe drop in car sales have 
both micro and macro dimensions. The macro-level factor is the overall deep 
recession and the associated “credit crunch.” In 2007, nearly two million new 
US cars were purchased with funds from home equity loans,20 and in mid-2008, 
the lack of access to automotive loans on affordable terms prompted buyers to 
postpone purchases. The instability of the job market combined with individual 
consumer finances discouraged consumers with working vehicles from taking on 
new loans and payments. Micro-level contributions include the recent oversell-
ing of cars due to cheap credit, price discounting, and the postponable nature 
of automobile purchases. This overselling has made the current distress even 
deeper than it otherwise would have been.
The US government took unprecedented steps to stave off complete collapse, 
including liquidation of any of the Big Three, and was thoroughly involved in 
both the adjustment and the substance of restructuring the automotive sector. 
The cost of the US governmental assistance to the automotive sector amounted 
to a total of $36.5 billion. First, the federal government created the Automotive 
Industry Financing Program in December 2008 to provide $23 billion of direct 
assistance to GM and Chrysler, under the conditions of acceptable restructuring 
plans by March 30, 2009, including union concessions, management changes, 
and product realignments. When Chrysler failed to abide by these conditions, it 
was forced into bankruptcy. Second, the crisis in the credit markets jeopardized 
the ability of these lenders to continue supporting sales. The government pro-
vided further assistance in the amount of $7.4 billion to General Motors Accept-
ance Corporation ($6 billion) and Chrysler Financial ($1.4 billion), the financing 
arms of the two companies. Third, as a way to prevent spillover effects from the 
financial difficulties of GM and Chrysler onto their suppliers, the Supplier Support 
Program, which totaled $5 billion in government financing, provided assistance 
to first tier suppliers designated by GM and Chrysler. Fourth, a Warranty Com-
mitment Program of $1.1 billion was set up to guarantee warranties on vehicles 
purchased during restructuring and to boost consumer confidence in the value 
of product warranties in the event of company bankruptcy. Lastly, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 established an office to coordinate assis-
tance to communities and workers adversely affected by the loss of automotive 
manufacturing jobs.
Through restructuring, GM has emerged as a new firm. In exchange for about 
$50 billion in investments, GM was forced to cut executive pay and eliminate 
47,000 jobs in 2009; it also discontinued many of its brands such as Pontiac, 
20 Bai (2012).
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Cadillac, Chevrolet and GMC. Chrysler is now owned by the United Auto Workers 
union (55%), as well as by Fiat S.P.A. (35%).21 Ford was the only company to 
survive without entering into bankruptcy; this was mainly because it received a 
huge line of credit in 2007. As of early 2014, all the major American manufacturers 
have gone on to increase their sales and have recently posted profits regarding 
their sales figures.
In that case, what would be the broader implications of such sectoral interven-
tion? While not alone in bailing out its automotive industry, the US’ action affects 
international rules and practices for sectoral intervention. First, the bailouts for GM 
and Chrysler cannot escape the critique of discriminating against foreign automak-
ers who not only produce vehicles in America, but are also important for domestic 
employment and the overall health of manufacturing. In 2009, the House of Repre-
sentatives approved a provision to exclusively use Big Three models for government 
procurement; however, Congress rejected it because it was more protectionist and 
discriminatory than other Buy American Provisions by excluding vehicles made 
in the US by transplant factories of foreign automakers.22 Second, as companies 
around the world accept government bailouts, they too are being forced to march 
to the priorities set by political leaders. Since GM struggled in the US market, half of 
its profits came from emerging markets such as China. In May 2009, GM informed 
Congress of its plan to produce roughly 50,000 subcompacts in China annually to 
be sold in the US market. However, as part of its deal with the UAW, GM agreed to 
not import cars from China, but produce them in the US instead. It is debatable 
whether this can be interpreted as a government-mandated quantitative restriction 
on auto imports or merely part of a labor deal with the UAW.
3.2  Western Europe and France
As the engine of the European economy, the European automotive industry gen-
erates a turnover of €551 billion, representing around 6.5% of Europe’s GDP, and 
creating about one in ten jobs, directly or indirectly.23 The slump in the European 
automotive market began before the start of 2008 financial crisis with production 
21 The Wall Street Journal, 28 April 2009.
22 According to the Section 504 of the “Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, 2010,” “None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to purchase 
passenger motor vehicles other than those manufactured by Ford, General Motors, or Chrysler.” 
For the details, please see Global Trade Alert (http://www.globaltradealert.org/node/312).
23 ILO (2010): according to the report, the industry directly and indirectly provides jobs to over 
12 million families. The multiplier effect of the 2.2 million direct employees at vehicle manufac-
turers and their suppliers is enormous. One job at the vehicle manufacturer creates four more at 
suppliers and another five in related sectors and retail.
Shifting gears: industrial policy and automotive industry      13
capacity being about 30% greater than the market capacity.24 Although automak-
ers were able to pump up sales with large rebates and easy consumer credit, sales 
remained within a relatively narrow trading range of about 17 million units. The 
crisis broke that model, leading to devastating effects on European automakers, 
along with serious implications for the wider economy. In December 2008, the 
registration of new cars fell to 19% in the European Union, 62% in Ireland, 50% 
in Spain, 46% in Denmark, 45% in Sweden, 21% in England, 16% in France, and 
7% in Germany.25
At the European level, the only significant measure to deal with the crisis was 
the European Investment Bank’s loans to manufacturers and suppliers of up to 
€8.5 billion in 2009. The European Commission adopted the Temporary Frame-
work in order to grant member states permission to grant financial aid to compa-
nies. The European Union originally maintained strict state aid programs under 
close monitoring by the European Commission that had the threat of tough dis-
ciplinary action. However, the European Commission had to compromise when 
it found itself being marginalized by the member states that insisted on offering 
bailouts and financial aid to domestic companies.
At the national level, the interventions by EU member states were pre-
dominantly bailouts, which was politically unthinkable just a few years ago.26 
However, a lack of coordination between states led to an uneven playing field 
among automakers by producing a risk for distorted competition depending on 
location. Thus, the impact of state intervention varied because European car 
manufacturing clearly splits into two camps – one is dominated by firms such as 
Volvo, Jaguar and Land Rover, who chose the strategy of maximizing margins and 
aggressively expanding to emerging economies in China or India.27 The others 
are those who focus on maximizing volume and emphasize European markets 
such as Peugeot, Fiat and Renault. The crisis has further divided the two, and 
the market has ruthlessly hurt the latter. The most affected markets were France, 
Spain and Italy, where almost 85% of the cars sold are small and medium-sized 
models that already have lower margins and European markets.
The French governmental intervention exemplifies the dilemma facing the 
automotive industry in continental Europe – i.e., how to tackle massive overca-
pacity with freezes on job cuts and factory closures. France is home to two of the 
world’s top ten automakers by volume. Peugeot ranks second among European 
24 Time, 30 July 2012.
25 Brunel and Hufbauer (2009: p. 5).
26 Italian government provided a $1.7 billion package to stimulate car sales; the British govern-
ment provided a $3.25 billion lifeline for the sector. Forbes, 9 February 2009.
27 Ford sold Jaguar and Land Rover to Ta ta in 2008 while Geely Automobile purchased Volvo.
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automakers after Volkswagen, and Renault is another French champion whose 
largest shareholder is the French government, which holds 15% ownership. 
Both have severely suffered as a result of their heavy reliance on relatively low-
margin models in the declining European car market. As an initial aid package, 
the government provided a total of €1.3 billion bailout funds, €300 million for 
scrapping schemes, and €1.0 billion euros ($1.92 billion) of preferential rate 
loans to the financing arms of the carmakers on December 2008. The French 
government utilized generous industrial policies to ensure that domestic com-
panies remained loyal to the French market. In February 2009, the government 
offered bailouts of €3 billion ($3.9 billion) for the duration of 5 years, an inter-
est rate of 6% to both Peugeot and Renault.28 The loans were conditional on 
refraining from any major restructuring plans: halting layoffs, freezing moving 
production abroad, and suspending factory closures in France for the dura-
tion of bailouts.29 As a result, in 2010, Renault was forced to drop its plan of 
outsourcing the production of its subcompact car (the Clio) to Turkey. The con-
struction of a Peugeot plant in the Czech Republic also upset then president, 
Sarkozy, who stated that building a plant in India to sell French cars to Indians 
was perfectly acceptable, but building a plant in the Czech Republic to sell cars 
in France was not.30 Such a measure intended to hurt the long-term competi-
tiveness of the French automakers without adjusting other economic condi-
tions like labor cost.31 Between 2000 and 2010, unit labor costs in the French 
automotive industry went up by 8%, compared with only 1.6% in Germany – 
making labor costs about 20% higher in France than in Germany, far higher 
than in countries such as Romania, where Renault builds the Logan. In spite 
of governmental support (or arguably because of governmental support) the 
crisis further distressed automakers, forcing Peugeot to post a net loss of €5 
billion in 2012. In response to Peugeot’s subsequent plan of shutting down the 
Paris-region plants and laying off 8000 workers, the French government pro-
vided Peugeot’s financial unit, Banque PSA Finance, with credit guarantees 
up to €7 billion. In addition, the François Hollande government added several 
conditions to influence company decisions by having the state and workers 
receive a seat on the board of directors, as well as setting up an outside com-
mittee with veto power over any significant changes in Peugeot’s operations.32 
The French industry minister, Arnaud Montebourg, emphasized that Peugeot 
28 Forbes, 2 September 2009; Automotive News, 9 February 2009.
29 The Independent, 21 January 2009.
30 The Telegraph, 9 February 2009.
31 The Wall Street Journal, 19 March 2009. 
32 Bloomberg, 24 October 2012; New York Times, 24 October 2012; Spiegel, 17 August 2012.
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represents “the history of France, a territory, a national idea” in his meeting 
with Peugeot officials.33
However, the mercantilist spirit and the “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy of 
repatriation of production from other EU member states delay the deep restruc-
turing necessary to boost companies’ global competitiveness. French automak-
ers were unable to raise prices to keep up with cost increases because, unlike 
their German competitors such as Audi, BMW and Mercedes-Benz, they do not 
make any luxury cars. Initially, this meant declining profits, but now, French 
carmakers are actually losing money and missing out on the opportunities 
offered by globalization. Peugeot sells more than half of their cars in Europe, 
where the market is shrinking, whereas Volkswagen sells only about a third 
of its cars in Europe and is establishing a strong presence in emerging econ-
omies such as the Chinese market. Employees at Renault’s plant in Romania 
are working overtime to keep up with demand for two low-cost models, while 
Renault is struggling to get by at its domestic base.34 The inward looking auto 
industrial policy may retard the recovery process of the sector even when the 
general economy recovers; this is especially true because the crisis in the auto-
motive industry in Europe is not a temporary slump since the potential for 
increased sales are simply capped by demographics and meager projections for 
income growth. Under shrinking demand and rising costs, it is clear that future 
growth lies in overseas markets and that only the innovative car manufactures 
can survive.
3.3  Emerging economies and China
Emerging economies fared relatively well during the 2008 financial crisis partly 
due to a shift of the supply and demand of automobiles from developed to emerg-
ing economies and their relatively closed financial systems. This trend is well 
pronounced in the case of China. China overtook the US in total vehicle produc-
tion with an output of 9.5 million vehicles in 2008 and Japan in 2009, to become 
the world’s largest producer with a production of 13.6-million vehicles (Figure 3). 
China’s annual vehicle output increased from  < 2 million vehicles in the late 1990s 
to over 18 million in 2011, almost doubling its 2008 output. However, China is not 
33 Spiegel, 17 August 2012. 
34 They offered compensation packages to entice some 10,000 factory workers in France to leave 
their jobs. Both are relying heavily on “partial unemployment” schemes, under which employees 
work half-time and receive about 70% of their wages, which are subsidized by the state.
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unscathed by the 2008 crisis – its auto sales growth of almost 9% in January 2009 
is still a sharp decline from its 24% increase in January 2008.36
China’s intervention in the automotive sector shows a somewhat different 
pattern from other industrial sectors where policies favor SOEs at the expense of 
foreign companies. China’s government’s strict ownership regulations on foreign 
investment produced bifurcated actors of 1) joint ventures (JVs) between Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign automakers, as well as 2) Chinese 
independent automakers. Due to this bifurcated market structure, China’s inter-
vention in the sector is geared towards promoting domestic independent automak-
ers, at the expense of JVs and SOEs. In response to the financial crisis, the Chinese 
government developed the following set of industrial policies for the automotive 
sector. First, the government forced the foreign partners of JVs to develop local 
brands, establish R&D facilities, and add electric vehicles to their product lineups 
as a necessary condition to build new plants or expand capacity.37 According to 
an executive from Peugeot Citroen, a local brand was part of the deal in its new 
JV with Chang’an; Volkswagen also confirmed that it was considering developing 
local brands in order to fulfill the conditions of building a new plant in Foshan.38
In 2008, major JVs began announcing their plans to develop low-cost models 
for sale solely in China, such as Guangzhou Honda’s Everus S1, which is just 
an older yet rebadged model of the Honda Fit.39 These indigenous brands are 
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Figure 3 Automotive production by country (2000–2011).35
35 Teng (2012). 
36 Gasgoo Automotive News, 4 February 2009, “China May Cut Second-Hand Car Sales Tax to 1%.”
37 Automotive News China, 24 April 2012.
38 Financial Times, 1 March 2011.
39 Motor Trend, 9 August 2011. 
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created out of political conditions, not out of commercial  calculation, so it is 
hard to predict their success in the market in the long run. Foreign manufactur-
ers basically recycle their old products as a new JV sub-brand without allowing 
SOE partner to gain any technological advancement.40 In  addition,  international 
parent companies do not fully support these models, as  sub-brands are owned by 
the JVs and not by international parent companies.
Second, while pressuring JVs to develop indigenous models, the govern-
ment has used stimulus packages and governmental procurement to promote 
Chinese independent automakers such as Chery and Geely.41 In November 2008, 
the Chinese government introduced a financial stimulus-spending package 
of four trillion RMB ($586 billion), as well as financial incentives to encour-
age vehicle ownership. As part of the package, the National Development and 
Reform Commission issued the Automotive Industry Readjustment and Revi-
talization Plan in March 2009. First, the Plan launched an 18-month cash-for-
clunker program, offering subsidies from 5000 to 18,000 RMB ($735–$2647), 
depending on vehicle category and engine size. It even reached rural areas, 
thereby encouraging farmers to trade in their old, environmentally unfriendly 
vehicles by providing a 10% discount and a maximum subsidy of 5000 RBM 
($735) per household. By the end of December 2009, the Chinese government 
had subsidized the purchase of 5.84 million cars for a total of 8.68 billion RMB 
($1.25 billion).42 Second, the Plan reduced the vehicle purchase tax from 10% 
to 5% on smaller passenger cars with engines of 1.6 L or less. The tax was then 
raised to 7.5% in 2010, and expired at the end of 2010. These two measures dis-
proportionally favored independent automakers over JVs, since their main pro-
duction focused on smaller and less expensive cars. The 2009 stimulus package 
not only increased the mini car market as a whole by 36%, but also increased 
the market share of four independent automaker models (Cherry QQ, BYD F0, 
Geely Panda and Great Wall Peri) to 55% within a month of announcing the tax 
breaks and subsidies.43
Third, the Plan adopted Buy China provisions for government procurement 
by requiring no  < 50% of replacement vehicles of official governmental fleets to 
be bought from independent Chinese automakers. A Wall Street Journal report 
cited Xinhua, the Chinese official news agency, to show that the annual official 
40 China Car Times, 12 January 2012. 
41 Chery and Geely once reached 5.1% and 4% of the market share respectively in 2007, but suf-
fered at 2.8% and 2.6% in 2012.
42 Teng (2012). 
43 Chang (2011).
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vehicles procurement budget was more than 100 billion RMB (approximately 
$15.6 billion) in 2011.44
In 2012, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released a draft 
of “The Model Directory for Selection of Vehicles for Use by Party and Govern-
ment Organs 2012.”45 All 412 models approved for procurement by state agencies 
are limited to Chinese local brands by lowering the price limit from 250,000 RMB 
to 180,000 RMB, as well as added requirements to the R&D spending and dura-
tion.46 Although this list would give Chinese automakers an advantage in a fleet 
market worth about 120 billion RMB (approximately $19 billion), it is question-
able whether such a policy would benefit domestic car manufacturers in the long 
run and make them more competitive. In response to the complaints from the EU 
Chamber in China on discriminating against JVs,47 Li Yizhong, a Chinese official 
at the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, argues that the selection 
criteria falls in line with WTO regulations since it includes engines under 1.8 L, 
and prices below 180,000 RMB.48
In addition to the discriminatory nature of such measures,49 foreign com-
panies express worry that the door for fair competition in public procurement 
is tightly shut since China has not signed the WTO’s Government Procurement 
Agreement. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it promised to join the Gov-
ernment Procurement Agreement. Currently, it defends its buy national program 
as being consistent with similar programs in other WTO countries such as the 
Buy American Act in the US.50 However, the Buy American Act requirements are 
waived where the US has trade agreements with signatories of the Government 
Procurement Agreement and countries that the US has signed free trade agree-
ments with.
44 The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2011; Bloomberg.com, 26 February 2012; China.org.cn, 1 
March 2012; Automotive News China, 2 March 2012.
45 The Website of the Ministry of Industy and Information Techonology of the People’s Republic 
of China, 24 February 2012. 
46 Companies have to spend no less than three percent of annual revenue on R&D in the last 
2 years. The only exceptions to the policy are foreign-built and JV luxury vehicles bought for 
officials ranking at or above the vice-minister level including Audi, Mercedes Benz and BMW 
models. The announcement aims to help local brands gain in the market of government fleets of 
80 billion RMB ($12.7 billion) at the expense of JVs and their foreign brands. The list includes Fir 
Auto Works’ Hongqi, SAIC’s Rongwei and Mingjue, Tianjin Xiali to name a new.
47 The China Times, 27 February 2012.
48 Ajoo Kyungje, 9 March 2012.
49 European Union Trade Commission (2010). 
50 Matechak and Gerson (2010). 
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4  Implications for trade liberalization
The rise of mercantilist spirit and protectionist intervention measures in the auto-
motive sector clouds the prospects of trade liberalization at the global level as 
national intervention becomes the new norm in the face of the unprecedented 
crash of the automotive market. National strategies which take the form of taxing 
or restricting market access to foreign industries are more disputed at the WTO 
because of its clearly negative cross-border spillovers, compared to inward 
looking strategies of subsidizing domestic industries. Bailouts of domestic 
automakers against transplants are discriminatory yet murky, and their impacts 
are not immediately measureable.
As several critical cases brought before the WTO demonstrate, trade disputes 
are politically waged as tit-for-tat game, and spiraling into different measures 
instead of serving as a deterrent. Since 2005, there have been three trade disputes 
in the automotive sector, all involving China and the US. The first case is China’s 
Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (DS 340), by which the US, fol-
lowed by the E.U. and Canada, contested China’s tariffs on imported cars in 2006. 
The second case deals with China’s subsidies for local automakers  – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts Industries (DS 450) – 
brought by the US in September 2012. The third and the most recently concluded 
dispute case is on China’s anti-dumping and countervailing duties on certain 
automobiles from the US (DS 440).
China’s WTO entry in 2001 reformulated the rule of the game in the automo-
tive sector through its introduction of new tariff regulations and liberalization 
measures. China not only abandoned the local content requirement that had been 
employed for nearly two decades, but also lowered the tariff on imported cars from 
80% to 100% to 25% and on imported parts and components from 15% to 50% to 
10% by July 2006. However, to counteract the removal of local content regulation, 
in 2004 the Chinese government adopted severe measures on imported automotive 
parts. If a final vehicle produced in China has more than 60% of imported parts in 
terms of value or number, it would be viewed as a completely imported car, and 
charged a 25% tariff instead of the 10% tariff on automotive parts.51 Foreign parts 
makers outside of China widely criticized such measures as market entry barriers 
and formed a strong export-lobbying group. They argued that the tariffs consti-
tute a discriminatory charge that favor Chinese originating automotive parts and 
serve as a subsidy for automakers to use domestic rather than imported parts.52 
51 General Administration of Customs Public Announcement of People’s Republic of China, 
No. 4, which entered into force on 1 April 2005.
52 For the background of the dispute, USTR News, 18 July 2008.
20      Seung-Youn Oh
In 2006, pressured by domestic automotive parts makers, trade representatives 
from the US, the E.U. and Canada contested China’s tariffs on imported automo-
tive parts at the WTO. Beijing argued that the measures were necessary corrective 
actions. In other words, it claimed that they were put in place to prevent importers 
from circumventing higher taxes on finished cars through illicitly importing whole 
cars in split shipments of automotive parts. After 4 years of negotiations and WTO 
reviews, the Chinese government removed the measure in August 2009.
This ruling potentially benefits auto parts exporters globally by removing the 
measures against all imports. However, it has less impact than expected on the 
auto parts sourcing and imports for the global automakers operating in China. US 
auto parts exports to China increased from $893 million in 2008 to $937 million 
(4.9%) in 2009, and again 36.4% to 1.3 billion in 2010.53 However, it is hard to say 
that the increase in 2010 is the direct result of the removal of import tariffs. The 
US auto parts trade deficit has been steadily increasing since 2001, except during 
2009, since it was the year immediately after the financial crisis. While almost 
80% of American parts exports went to Canada, Mexico, the E.U., and Japan in 
2009 and 2010, the US had the greatest auto parts trade deficit with Japan. Luxury 
vehicles such as BMW, and those with engines of 2.5 L or more are mostly pro-
duced in foreign countries and exported to China.54
Furthermore, the development of global supply chains complicates the domes-
tic political payoff in contesting Chinese measures at the WTO, and diverges inter-
ests between export-lobbying groups in home countries and localized suppliers 
in emerging markets. In his interview with The New York Times, Kevin Wale, the 
President of GM, commented that “China’s decision to comply with the WTO rules 
on the tariffs on the imported automotive parts will have virtually no impact on 
our operation, because most of our operation is already localized and produced 
within China.”55 This shows how localized supply chains ensure that the automak-
ers operating in China have been relatively less affected by the ruling. China’s 
current top automaker Shanghai GM, started its JV in 1997 and achieved a locali-
zation rate of over 90% by the end of the 1990s. GM’s localized suppliers are not 
directly benefiting from the enlarged market access, thereby making the market 
entry of independent auto parts suppliers abroad less concerning. Unlike the 
assumptions of existing literature on MNCs as the main drivers of liberalization, 
53 The US-China auto parts trade deficit had grown six-fold from only $1.5 billion in 2001 to 
almost $8.2 billion in 2008. China’s auto parts exports to the US alone have increased 43% from 
2004 to 2009.
54 In 2011, the US exported about 92,000 luxury vehicles, worth about $3 billion to the Chinese 
market. 
55 The New York Times, 31 August 2009.
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MNCs often covertly support protectionist measures at sub-national levels to 
succeed in a competitive and fragmented market.56 JV requirements especially 
created a distinctive pattern of encouraging intra-national competition between 
regional JVs rather than competition between foreign and domestic companies. 
In alliance with SOEs and their foreign partners, sub-national governments often 
thwart the liberalizing effects of international and national regulations in order 
to succeed in the Chinese market. In these interactions, MNCs are hardly the con-
sistent champions of economic liberalization that they are often taken to be, but 
rather allies of sub-national actors who support local protectionism.
China’s compliance with WTO rulings reflects Beijing’s realpolitik and skillful 
navigation through the limitations of the WTO’s dispute-resolution rather than 
socialization. China often liberally implements industrial policies in order to 
achieve its economic development goals; it only removes them after they come 
into dispute at the WTO through “convenient compliance.”57 This in turn explains 
the weakness of the WTO final ruling that it does not serve as a deterrent. China’s 
efforts to boost the automotive sector have not ended with resolving tariffs on 
imported automotive parts, continuously causing concern among foreign govern-
ments and major automotive MNCs. In September 2012, the US opened a new case 
against China at the WTO over China’s March 2009 stimulus plan for domestic 
automakers – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts 
(DS 450).58 The stimulus plan for the automotive sector as illustrated in the earlier 
section includes lowering the sales tax on vehicles with small engines – which 
favored Chinese local brands – creating a $1.5 billion fund to promote technical 
innovation, and offering subsidies for developing proprietary brands and build-
ing export bases for autos and auto parts.59 Adopting new industrial policy meas-
ures to revitalize the auto sector despite the impact of removed tariffs on imported 
auto parts suggests the continuous nature of China’s compliance, which eludes 
the WTO rule enforcement.
The most recently concluded case against China in May 2014 is regarding 
China’s anti-dumping and countervailing duties on certain automobiles from 
the US brought by the US government in July 2012.60 This case shows how WTO 
trade disputes are used as high-stake game of tit for tat. China’s Ministry of Com-
merce announced the initiation of such trade remedy shortly after the Obama 
56 Oh (2013). 
57 Oh (2014). 
58 For the detail, please see World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlment: Dispute DS 450 
China – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts Industries.
59 USTR (2009: p. 68). 
60 USTR (2012).
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administration decided in September 2009 to impose a safeguard measure against 
Chinese tire imports. In December 2011, China began imposing antidumping duties 
range from 2.0% to 21.5%, claiming that these vehicles were being sold at less than 
fair value (i.e., “dumped”) into the Chinese market. China also imposed additional 
anti-subsidy tariffs of 12.9% on large-engine passenger vehicles from GM and 6.2% 
on Jeeps from Chrysler arguing that the US government bailout for GM and Chrysler 
had the effect of providing subsidies for these manufacturers’ exports. In July 2012, 
the US brought the case to the WTO with the claim that China’s “unjustified duties” 
affected about $5 billion in automobile exports.61 In May 2014, after 22 months of 
dispute process, the WTO panel ruled against China on the ground that China had 
failed to prove that the imports were causing any injury to its domestic industry. 
International free-trade rules require a so-called injury determination to prevent 
countries from imposing tariffs to forestall imports from entering at all, instead of 
waiting to see if they actually cause a problem. However, losing a WTO case does 
not necessarily play a deterrent role as illustrated above.
Concluding comprehensive bilateral free trade agreements with Asian and 
emerging countries as a way to move forward with trade liberalization and gaining 
access to foreign markets could be an option. However, the mercantilist spirit of 
imports would have a bearing on negotiating parties, which further feeds the 
expectation that each country has to win in every sector. It is already well known 
in the literature that protectionists are more likely to mobilize and shape policy 
than the “winners” from liberalization, due to the concentrated and more imme-
diate nature of the losses incurred and the greater diffusion of the benefits.62 The 
EU signed a landmark FTA with South Korea in 2011 but was temporarily blocked 
over fears of increased car imports and a veto by Italy. Thus, it is important to 
remember that the crisis was neither caused nor worsened by foreign imports. 
Also, in the case of Europe, believing that limiting imports will give European 
brands a chance to recover does not take into account the fact that the efficiently 
run European brands actually dominated other European countries and not the 
imports. Without recognizing the fundamental source of the problems, the auto 
market might not rebound even if the general economy does.
5  Conclusion
Following the financial crisis, policy and academic debates about the poten-
tial merits of industrial policy gained huge currency as governments urgently 
61 The New York Times, 23 May 2014. 
62 Baldwin (1985); Hillman (1989); Grossman and Helpman (1994); Hiscox (2002). 
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searched for new ways to increase growth and employment.63 As one of the most 
severely affected sectors by the crisis, the automotive industry has been the 
center of government’s defensive industrial policy of rescuing and restructur-
ing. However, the rise of global production network and the growth of emerging 
economies as promising centers of production and demands for vehicles require 
new sets of policy initiatives contingent on particular industrial and institutional 
contexts.
The 2008 financial crisis provides a turning point of rethinking inward-
looking and domestic manufacturer focused industrial policies. The automotive 
market crash is neither a passing problem nor caused by foreign imports. Instead, 
the crisis of the past decade has unearthed deeply rooted structural problems. 
Policies that are mercantilist and protectionist would rather hamper the competi-
tiveness of domestic automakers even after the industrial policies are unwinding. 
Britain already learned the lesson in the 1970s that domestic ownership and full 
employment in the automotive industry is not the very manifestation of national 
pride. Aggressive expansion to emerging markets and even attracting more trans-
plants of foreign-owned automakers to home base can turn out to be more stra-
tegic and effective than repatriation or hampering imports. It is not surprising 
that automakers such as Volkswagen who focus on margins and aggressively 
expanding to new manufacturing bases in emerging economies have weathered 
through the crisis better than those who emphasize volume maximization with 
low margin in regional markets.
Setting aside the counterfactual claim that protectionism would have been 
worse during the crisis in the absence of WTO rules, states have deliberately 
attempted to circumvent existing multilateral trade rules. Concerning voices have 
been raised whether the automotive industry might follow the precedent of the 
agricultural sector of removing itself from the rules of the international trading 
system.64 Although the automotive sector would not exactly follow suit, the WTO’s 
trade prospects are affected by member countries’ frequent use of discrimina-
tory measures as their foremost method of surviving the financial crisis. Since 
many countries either have thought about or are contemplating using murky pro-
tectionist tools, it may very well be that no WTO member will challenge another 
WTO member over protectionist measures. In the face of opposition from member 
countries, even the European Union had to make temporary acquiescence to 
relax rules for financial assistance to companies at the national level. Moreover, 
due to the failed Doha round for the past decade, economic and trade liberaliza-
tion have proceeded with litigation and contentious interpretations of WTO rules. 
63 Aggarwal and Evenett (2010, 2012); Rodrik (2010).
64 Brunel and Hufbauer (2009).
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However, cases that are brought to the WTO tend to be part of a big high-stakes 
game of tit-for-tat as seen in retaliatory series of trade tensions between the US 
and China. When emerging countries like China can game the WTO system and 
the WTO disputes are used as a tit-for-tat between China and the US, this raises 
important systemic issues that need to be investigated further for not only the 
WTO but also free market principles, more generally.
References
Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Simon J. Evenett. 2010. “Financial Crisis, ‘New’ Industrial Policy, and 
the Bite of Multilateral Trade Rules.” Asian Economic Policy Review 5 (2): 221–244.
Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Simon J. Evenett. 2012. “Industrial Policy Choice During the Crisis Era.” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28 (2): 261–283.
Bai, Xue. 2012. “The Effects of the 2007–2009 Economic Crisis on Global Automobile Industry.” 
Applied Economics Thesis at Department of Economics and Finance, State University of 
New York College at Buffalo.
Baldwin, Richard. 1985. The Political Economy of US Import Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baldwin, Richard, and Simon J. Evenett. 2009. The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protec-
tionist, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20. London: Centre for Economic Policy 
Research: http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/focus/papers/Protectionism.pdf.
Barfield, Claude. 2009. “Protectionism and the Global Economic Crisis.” American Enterprise 
Institute. Accessed 21 September 2014. http://www.aei.org/article/economics/fiscal-
policy/protectionism-and-the-global-economic-crisis/.
Brunel, Claire, and Gary C. Hufbauer. 2009. “Money for the Auto Industry: Consistent with WTO 
Rules.” Peterson Institute for International Economics. Number PB09-4, February 2009. 
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb09-4.pdf
Chang, Crystal. 2011. “Stumbling Toward Capitalism: The State, Global Production Networks, 
and the Unexpected Emergence of China’s Independent Auto Industry.” Ph.D. diss., 
Berkeley: University of California.
European Union Trade Commission. 2010. Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy as 
a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 strategy. European Trade Commission. http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_146953.pdf.
Gereffi, G., J. Humphrey, and T. Sturgeon. 2005. “The Governance of Global Value Chains.” 
Review of International Political Economy 12 (1): 78–104.
Gene M. Grossman and E. Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” The American Economic review 
84 (4): 833–850. http://pages.uoregon.edu/bruceb/Andrea.pdf.
Hillman, A. 1989. The Political Economy of Protection. London: Harwood Academic Publisher.
Hiscox, M. 2002. International Trade and Political Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
ILO. 2010. “Automotive Industry: Trends and Reflections.” The Global Economic Crisis Sectoral 
Coverage. Working Paper 278. International Labor Organization.
IMVP. 2009. “The Global Automotive Industry Crisis: A Way Ahead.” An IMVP Position Paper. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: IMVP, MIT.
Shifting gears: industrial policy and automotive industry      25
James, William E. 2008. “The US Financial Crisis, Global Financial Turmoil, and Developing Asia: 
Is the Era of high Growth at an End?” ADB Economics Working Paper Series. Mandaluyong 
City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.
Matechak, Jason, and Brett Gerson. 2010. “Can China’s Government Procurement Market Be 
Cracked?” China Business Review 37 (3): 34.
OECD. 2010. “The Automobile Industry in and Beyond The Crisis.” Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 745. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Oh, Seung-Youn. 2013. “Fragmented Liberalization in the Chinese Automotive Industry: The 
Political Logic behind Beijing Hyundai’s Success in the Chinese Market.” China Quarterly 
216: 920–945.
Oh, Seung-Youn. 2014. “Gone with the Wind: How China Outsmarts the WTO Rulings in the 
Wind Industry.”Asian Survey (In Press).
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press.
Pilat, D., A. Cimper, K. Olsen, and C. Webb. 2008. “The Changing Nature of Manufacturing in 
OECD Economies.” In Staying Competitive in the Global Economy: Compendium of Studies 
on Global Value Chains. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
PWC. 2009. Automotive Review. Global Automotive Review. London: PWC Automotive Institute.
Rodrik, Dani. 2010. “The Return of Industrial Policy.” Project Syndicate. 12 April 2010. 
Accessed 22 September 2014. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-
of-industrial-policy .
Teng, Rachel. 2012. China’s Auto Sector Development and Policies: Issues and Implications. 
Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2012. World Investment Report 2012: 
Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies. Geneva: UNCTAD.
United Nations Industrial Development Organization. 2011. Industrial Development Report. 
Vienna: UNIDO.
USTR. 2009. “USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance.” USTR News.
USTR. 2012. “Obama  Administration Challenges China’s Unfair Imposition of Duties on 
America-Made Automobiles.” USTR Press Release.
